Table of Contents
Preface Main Page
Foreword


Part 1 The Negotiating Context
1. The Climate Change Problem
2. The Climate Convention
and the Kyoto Protocol
3. The Bodies in the Regime
4. The Rules of Procedure
5. State and Non-State Actors
6. Coalitions in the Climate
Change Regime
7. The G-77 and China

Part 2 Negotiating Skills
8. The Ideal Negotiator
9. The Handicapped Negotiator
10. Coping Strategies
11. Tips and Tricks for the
Lonely Diplomat
12. Index to the FCCC
13. References




Part II: Negotiating Skills
9. The Handicapped Negotiator
Introduction / The negotiator in the domestic context - the hollow mandate / The negotiator at the negotiations - the handicapped negotiating power / Negotiating strategy / Tips and tricks

9.3 The negotiator at the negotiations - the handicapped negotiating power

If there is a hollow mandate and handicapped coalition forming power, it is inevitable that statements will be rhetorical and not focused on problem solving (Gupta 2000a,b). Rhetorical statements tend to point out that it is the developed countries that have been the major polluters and that they should take action first and transfer technologies to developing countries. There is nothing intrinsically wrong with such a statement, but it needs to be made more explicit. Thus, developing countries need to either come up with what they think are reasonable goals to be achieved in, for example, the second budget period; or what specific technologies they want transferred and under what types of conditions. This all calls for considerable homework, and lobbying at international level; it cannot be churned out over night. Lynn Wagner (1999) has actually counted and assessed the statements made by different countries during the negotiations of the Commission for Sustainable Development, and shows that the G-77 does not often make problem solving statements (see Figure 7).


At the negotiations, the developed countries are thus far better prepared than the developing countries. The developed countries come up with a variety of suggestions. Responding to these suggestions is difficult because the lack of a fundamental ideological consensus between the developing countries implies that it is difficult to develop common reactive positions during the negotiations that go beyond rhetoric. Sometimes, the suggestions of the developed countries may include side-payments. Here developing countries may find it difficult to see the side-payments and the issue-linkages made by the developed countries in a positive light. At the actual negotiations, since there are multiple negotiations taking place at multiple formal and informal sessions, the developing countries have difficulties coping with the number of negotiating drafts, changing context of negotiations, multiple meetings, informal and non-transparent decision-making procedures as compared to the developed countries who normally send a large negotiating team. When developing countries negotiate to defend vaguely articulated national interests, while the developed countries have a far more clear vision of their own interests, this is neither very motivating nor is it very successful. This implies that the developing countries have handicapped negotiating power at the international negotiations.