9.2 The negotiator in the domestic context - the hollow mandate

Negotiators from most developing countries have a serious challenge before them. Many of their countries have not developed a clear vision on how they define sustainable development, nor do they have a clear ideological framework. These negotiators often have to cope with conflicting scientific information at the international level. They do not have much support from national environmental and social groups or from industry on the issue of climate policy. There are no clearly defined long-term policy goals on the climate issue. Some countries do have policymaking frameworks but these are sometimes more a matter of form than substance. Under these circumstances, and given that the scientific information and the issues for negotiation are becoming increasingly complex, the developing country negotiator tends to fall back on making general statements and rhetorical remarks. All this adds up to a "hollow negotiating mandate" (see Table 10).

Box 3. Scientific controversies

Policymakers selectively use scientific results to promote their own goals. Thus there are policymakers who argue that reducing emissions in the North will lead to a collapse of the global economy (and hence emissions of the South), and that it is clearly not in the developing countries' interests to call for major emission reductions in the North. Then there are others who argue that it is pointless for the North to reduce its emissions, since it will be rendered negligible by the huge growth of emissions in the South. It is very difficult under such circumstances to know whether by arguing for tough climate change policy measures in the North, the developing countries are hurting their own economic interests or not.

There is another example of confusing scientific information that led to defensive negotiations. Jose Goldemberg (1994: 176) recalls an incident where primarily because of deforestation data about Brazilian forests coming from the North, Brazil went on the defensive to deny that there was any such problem. However, when it became apparent that the actual scale of deforestation was not as "extensive or catastrophic," the government adopted a more realistic approach and was less defensive and more constructive in the process.

When negotiators have a hollow or rhetorical mandate, it becomes very difficult to develop a regional negotiating position. Because different developing countries have different levels of confusion about the ideological routes and sustainable development goals to which they are reaching out, there is a lack of political synergy between countries (Gupta 2000a,b). In such situations, some countries adopt the realpolitik argument that it is a hard world, and one must take what one can get. Again, at the level of individual countries there is a lack of new and solid scientific material. This implies that when countries try to pool their resources together, sometimes there is not much to pool. In other cases, some countries have scientific information, but this is difficult for others to accept until it is verified and scrutinized in their own countries. Given the lack of involvement from national NGOs, industries and sometimes politicians, the negotiators are in general quite alone and unsupported. Participation in the various meetings is at best sporadic; not all countries attend all meetings and all sessions within the meetings. This implies that there is a lack of staying power and the lack of resources impedes the ability of the Group to meet between sessions and develop specific common positions. Common interests are thus determined in very abstract terms such as the need for technology transfer and capacity building. All this adds up to a handicapped coalition-forming power (see Table 11).