10.2 Coping with handicapped negotiating power

The negotiator may then want to use his or her aspiration position to negotiate the regional position. The regional position should not fall below the reserve position.

The G-77 position is the common denominator among all positions of developing countries. That is why it ends up having very little substance at times, and very little constructive value. This is where it becomes important to understand how to increase the area of commonality among G-77 and China countries. Let us take the example of the completely diverse views of AOSIS and OPEC in relation to whether there should be stringent measures taken to reduce GHG emissions in developed countries. In the ultimate analysis, it appeared that stringent measures were seen as important for 120 G-77 countries with the bulk of the combined population. Only a few countries were opposed. This led to the birth of the Green G-77 (see Box 5). Another example is the belief of some NGOs and many developing countries that CDM should be restricted to certain technologies and certain sectors so that specific sustainable technologies get the maximum push. Others fear that if that happens, there will be limited resources for their countries, and so they support sinks and all technologies. This brings us to the need to apply bargaining techniques to reach integrative bargaining as opposed to distributive bargaining (see Section 8.3). There is need to increase the number of alternatives, to maintain a series of fall back positions, to communicate clearly, to improve the negotiations through the quality and quantity of information and thereby to influence the perception of the others.

Box 5. Green G-77

The developing countries have, on occasion, developed tools to deal with dissension among the ranks. One such occasion took place at COP-1 in 1995. The developing countries were faced with the AOSIS position calling for major reductions in emissions and the OPEC position that wanted to postpone serious action. When the core of the G-77 decided that they wanted to support AOSIS, the Ambassador of India drafted a text and lobbied for support within the rest of G-77. Within 48 hours, 72 G-77 countries had come on board. By the time of submission 100 countries supported it. It was clear that OPEC was isolated and that the G-77 would proceed with its position, even without the support of OPEC. The OPEC countries finally caved in and joined the negotiations (Mwandosya 1999).