The International Negotiating Process on Climate Change

The Threat of Climate Change

Climate change is a global threat-to the earth's environment, the well being of its people and the strength of its economies. While the climate has always varied naturally, the vast majority of scientists now believe that the planet's climate is changing due to the rising concentrations of human-made greenhouse gases (GHGs) such as carbon dioxide (CO₂), methane (CH4), and nitrous oxide (N2O). These GHGs accumulate in the atmosphere to trap heat near the surface and could override the Earth's natural climatic variability and could lead to irreversible climatic change. Since the Industrial Revolution began in the 18th century, atmospheric concentrations of GHGs have risen significantly as a result of industrial and land use practices. These were in turn fed by population growth, world wars, rising affluence, and an increasing dependence on fossil fuels, which has come to seem almost inseparable from economic growth.

The International Response

In 1988, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) established the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), consisting of hundreds of leading scientists and experts on global warming. The panel was asked to assess the state of scientific knowledge concerning climate change, evaluate its potential environmental and socioeconomic impacts, and formulate realistic strategies to deal with the problem. Two years later, the IPCC published a report concluding that the growing accumulation of human-made greenhouse gases in the atmosphere would "enhance the greenhouse effect, resulting on average in an additional warming of the Earth's surface" by the next century, with continued temperature increases thereafter, unless measures were adopted to limit the emissions of these gases. The IPCC confirmed that climate change was a threat and called for an international treaty to address the problem.

Later that same year, the Second World Climate Conference echoed the same call. The United Nations General Assembly responded by formally launching negotiations on a framework convention on climate change and establishing an "Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee" (INC) to develop the treaty. Negotiations began in February 1991 in Washington, DC to formulate an international treaty on global climate protection. Those negotiations resulted in the completion by May 1992 of a United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

The UNFCCC was opened for signature at the UN Conference on Environment and Development (the Earth Summit) in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, on 4 June 1992, and entered into force on 21 March 1994. The Convention sets an "ultimate objective" of stabilizing atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases at safe levels. Such levels, which the Convention does not quantify, should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner. To achieve this objective, all countries have a general commitment to address climate change, adapt to its effects, and report their actions to implement the Convention. As of September 2000, 181 governments and the European Community have become Parties.

The Convention divides countries into two groups: Annex I Parties, the industrialized countries who have historically contributed the most to climate change, and non-Annex I Parties, which includes primarily the developing countries. The principles of equity and "common but differentiated responsibilities" contained in the Convention require Annex I Parties to take the lead in returning their greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000. They must also submit regular reports, known as national communications, detailing their climate change policies and programs, as well as annual inventories of their GHG emissions. The OECD members of Annex I have an obligation to provide financial assistance to developing countries to help them tackle climate change, as well as to transfer climate-friendly technologies to developing countries.

COP-1 and the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate (AGBM process)

By 1995, it had become clear that the UNFCCC's commitments were inadequate to achieve its goals, and governments began work to strengthen them. At COP-1 in Berlin, Germany, delegates reached agreement on what many believed to be the central issue before COP-1-adequacy of commitments-and established an open-ended Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate (AGBM) to begin a process toward appropriate action for the period beyond 2000, including the strengthening of the commitments of Annex I Parties through the adoption of a protocol or another legal instrument. COP-1 also requested the Secretariat to make arrangements for sessions of its two subsidiary bodies: the Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI), which were provided for in Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention. SBSTA would serve as the link between scientific, technical and technological assessments, the information provided by competent international bodies, and the policy-oriented needs of the COP. SBI was created to develop recommendations to assist the COP in the review and assessment of implementation of the UNFCCC and in the preparation and implementation of its decisions.

The AGBM met eight times between August 1995 and COP-3 in December 1997. During the first three sessions, governments focused on analyzing and assessing possible policies and measures for the strengthening of the commitments of Annex I Parties, how Annex I countries might distribute or share new commitments, and whether commitments should take the form of an amendment or protocol. Also in 1995, the IPCC issued its Second Assessment Report (SAR) that confirmed "the balance of evidence suggests that there is a discernible human influence on global climate". The SAR projected that global mean surface temperatures would increase by between 1 and 3.5 degrees C by 2100, the fastest rate of change since the end of the last ice age, and that global mean sea levels would rise by between 15 and 95 cm by 2100, flooding many low-lying coastal areas. The recognition of the SAR's findings by Parties to the COP was a source of protracted debate for several subsequent negotiating sessions.

COP-2

As more meetings of the AGBM were held, the debate between industrialized and developing countries continued to grow, and several private sector actors, such as large business and industry groups, began advancing the view that the uncertainties in the science of global climate change meant that any action was unwarranted. By AGBM-4, which coincided with COP-2 in Geneva in July 1996, governments completed their in-depth analysis of the likely elements of a protocol and appeared ready to prepare a negotiating text. Many governments also stressed the importance of having COP-2 adopt a declaration firmly stating that the science of climate change was compelling and that legally binding commitment were warranted. After many difficult debates, delegates took note of the "Geneva Ministerial Declaration," which endorsed the IPCC conclusions and called for legally binding objectives and significant reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. The Conference also saw a significant shift in position by the US, which for the first time supported a legally binding agreement to fulfill the Berlin Mandate. At AGBM-5, which met in December 1996, delegates recognized the need to decide whether or not to allow mechanisms that would provide Annex I Parties with flexibility in meeting quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives (QELROs).

As the Protocol was drafted during the sixth and seventh sessions of the AGBM, in March and August 1997, respectively, delegates "streamlined" a framework compilation text by merging or eliminating some overlapping provisions within the myriad of proposals. Much of the discussion centered on a proposal from the EU for a 15% cut in a "basket" of three greenhouse gases by the year 2010 compared to 1990 levels. The U.S. government proposed a system of international trading in emissions rights that would significantly reduce the costs of reductions. In October 1997, as AGBM-8 began, US President Bill Clinton, based on a resolution passed by the US Senate, included a call for "meaningful participation" by developing countries in the negotiating position he announced in Washington. With those words, the debates that shaped agreement back in 1995 resurfaced, with an insistence on G-77/China involvement once again linked to the level of ambition acceptable by the US. In response, the G-77/China used every opportunity to distance itself from any attempts to draw developing countries into agreeing to anything that could be interpreted as new commitments.

COP-3 and the Kyoto Protocol

After two and a half years of intense negotiations, the Kyoto Protocol was adopted at COP-3 on 11 December 1997. The Protocol commits Annex I Parties to individual, legally-binding targets to limit or reduce their emissions, amounting to a total cut of at least 5% from 1990 levels in the period 2008-2012. The Kyoto Protocol creates legally binding obligations for 38 industrialized countries, including 11 countries in Central and Eastern Europe, to return their emissions of GHGs to an average of approximately 5.2 percent below their 1990 levels as an average over the period 2008-2012. Targets cover the six main greenhouse gases: carbon dioxide (CO₂); methane (CH4); nitrous oxide (N2O); hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs); perfluorocarbons (PFCs); and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6). The Protocol also allows these countries the option of deciding which of the six gases it controls will form a part of their national emissions reduction strategy. Some activities in the land-use change and forestry sector, such as deforestation and reforestation, that emit or absorb carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, are also covered.

The Protocol also establishes three cooperative "mechanisms"-the clean development mechanism (CDM), joint implementation and emissions trading, which are designed to help Annex I Parties reduce the costs of meeting their emissions targets by achieving emission reductions at lower costs in other countries than they could domestically. The Kyoto mechanisms give countries and private sector companies the opportunity to reduce emissions anywhere in the world-where ever it is cheapest-and they can then count that towards their own targets. Compared with emission reductions in Europe or North America, the cost of reducing emissions may be substantially lower in developing countries and those economies in transition, where economic collapse following the demise of socialist regimes has caused emissions to decline to levels substantially below 1990 levels. According to their proponents, these mechanisms could result in a large financial flow towards developing and transition countries for emission reduction projects, and a large counter flow of emission credits. The CDM, in particular, aims to assist developing countries in achieving sustainable development by promoting environmentally friendly investment in their economies from industrialized country governments and businesses. These mechanisms were agreed in principle, but much work is currently underway to elaborate their details. Also under negotiation are the rules for ensuring compliance under the Protocol, as well as the provisions for the land-use change and forestry sector and the various ways of measuring emissions.

The Protocol was opened for signature in March 1998. As of September 2000, 84 governments have signed and 29 have ratified the Protocol. For the Kyoto Protocol to enter into force, 55 Parties to the Convention, including Annex I Parties accounting for 55% of carbon dioxide emissions from this group in 1990, must ratify the Protocol.

COP-4 and COP-5

At COP-4 in 1998, following hours of high-level "closed door" negotiations, delegates adopted the Buenos Aires Plan of Action. Under the Plan of Action, the Parties declared their determination to strengthen the implementation of the Convention and prepare for the future entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol, and said they would reach agreement on selected issues raised in the Kyoto Protocol by COP-6 in November 2000. The Plan contains the Parties' resolution to demonstrate substantial progress on: the financial mechanism; the development and transfer of technology; the implementation of UNFCCC Articles 4.8 and 4.9, as well as Protocol Articles 2.3 and 3.14; activities implemented jointly (AIJ); the mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol; and the preparations for first session of the Meeting of Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (COP/MOP-1). COP-5 met in Bonn, Germany, from 25 October - 5 November 1999. With over 3000 participants in attendance and 165 Parties represented, delegates continued their work toward fulfilling the BAPA by November 2000. Several workshops and countless informal consultations were held in the interim. Delegates decides to convene COP-6 in the year 2000, rather than delay it until 2001, and intensify negotiations in the run-up to COP-6.

COP-6

More than 7,000 participants from nearly 180 countries descended on The Hague in November 2000, where COP-6 was expected to decide on the details of the Kyoto Protocol and the UNFCCC. Many details had to be agreed upon in The Hague, with four critical issues looming from the outset: compliance, the Kyoto mechanisms, sinks, and the mechanisms for financial and technology transfer to developing countries. These four proved to be at the heart of the break-up of the talks on 25 November 2000. During the first week, negotiations continued in the format to which Parties have become accustomed, with discussions taking place in various subgroups where for the last three years the negotiators submitted text proposals for the detailed decisions by the COP. However, by the time of the start of COP-6 many issues still remained unresolved, many options open, and much of the text disputed. The first week of negotiations brought the Parties again closer together. But the pace was too slow. President Pronk, the Dutch Environment Minister, had asked the co-chairs of each of the break-out groups to present draft decisions with possibly three key decisions to be made by the high-level Ministerial session of the second week. They did not succeed.

The President decided to lead in the second week with an informal paper on what he saw to be the 'crunch issues'. These issues were grouped in four boxes, each to be discussed in separate groups comprised of Ministers and high-level officials representing all the negotiating groups. The President decided that further negotiations should only be between those who could actually make the political compromises needed. The text so carefully weighted and bracketed by governments over the last few years proved too difficult and technically detailed decisions were abandoned for a political agreement.

The principal negotiating text for this political agreement would be President Pronk's proposal, aimed at balancing the positions of the key negotiating groups. Released only 24 hours before the initial deadline of the conference, the paper brought new text and new ideas on the table. Dropping previously negotiated texts possibly caused re-polarization when Parties stepped back from their countries' positions to analyze the document. The reactions from the three main negotiating groups were a clear sign of how much they had been given by the President. The US and its allies in the Umbrella Group found the proposal a 'reasonable reflection of the positions'. The EU was 'very disappointed'. The G77/China, the developing country negotiating group, considered the document 'completely unacceptable and no basis for further negotiations'. Not even extended negotiations until the Saturday afternoon provided enough time in which to reach. One of the most critical issues at The Hague was that of 'sinks', using forests and other forms of land-use to absorb carbon dioxide, and counting them towards meeting the target. A group of key European negotiators from France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK had reached a complicated agreement with the Umbrella Group countries regarding the size of sinks they were allowed to have. However, no agreement was possible, as other EU countries found the agreement unacceptable.

COP-8

Delhi Declaration

The Delhi Declaration is a political statement that emerged from COP-8. The host Indian government prepared an initial draft that was considered informally in plenary. The draft had a strong focus on developing country issues of adaptation and sustainable development while emphasizing the responsibilities of developed countries. While this focus was welcome, several people noted that the draft Declaration fell short of addressing the need to broaden and deepen commitments globally in preparation for the second commitment period and beyond. Following extensive informal consultations, the Declaration was completed and adopted by the COP, albeit with reservations from some countries. The CG-11 did not support the Declaration, but did not object to its adoption by the COP. The EU submitted a statement of concern regarding the Declaration, noting that it lacked a clear, long-term vision.

The Delhi Declaration on Climate Change and Sustainable Development recalls the UNFCCC’s ultimate objective and reaffirms development and poverty eradication as overriding priorities in developing countries. It recognizes, with concern, the findings of the IPCC Third Assessment Report (TAR) and stresses the need for mitigation and adaptation measures. The vulnerability of developing countries--especially LDCs and Small Island Developing States--and Africa, as the region suffering most from the combined impacts of climate change and poverty, is recognized.

The Declaration calls for Parties that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol to urge others to ratify. It calls for policies and measures specific to each country’s conditions; integration of climate change objectives into national sustainable development strategies; and implementation of UNFCCC commitments according to Parties’ common but differentiated responsibilities, development priorities and circumstances. It notes that economic and social development and poverty eradication are the overriding priorities of developing countries and stresses adaptation, the exchange of information and consideration of developing country concerns arising from the adverse effects of climate change and implementation of response measures. The Declaration further calls for development, dissemination and investment in innovative technologies, the strengthening of technology transfer, as well as improved energy access, diversification of energy supplies and an increase in the use of renewable energy. It also stresses the need for Annex I Parties to take the lead and further implement their commitments under the UNFCCC, including those related to the provision of financial resources, technology transfer and capacity building.